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Chapter 9: Neighborhoods
Common Interest Communities:
Standards of Review and Review of Standards
Paula A. Franzese*
The author is pleased to participate in this festschrift in honor of
the superb teacher, scholar, and statesman Professor Daniel
Mandelker. As Henry Adams observed, “[a] teacher affects eternity.
He can never tell where his influence stops.” Professor Mandelker’s
influence will continue to be felt for generations to come. His
impeccable body of work has guided perceptions and shaped
outcomes for the better. A prolific writer and beloved teacher, Dan
has succeeded in the rarest of ways— as a great thinker unafraid to
demonstrate compassion. Indeed, so much of his legacy is rooted in
the precept that wisdom and compassion are indivisible.
Notwithstanding his exceptionally impressive body of work and
achievements, he remains modest, unassuming, and beneficent. When
I think of Professor Mandelker, I am reminded of a statement
attributed to Henry James: “Three things in human life are important
. . . . The first is to be kind. The second is to be kind. And the third is
to be kind.”
Headlines were made at the start of this new millenium as the
Tampa Palms, Florida Community Association (Association) sought
to enforce a restrictive covenant that would deny six-year old Brage
Sassin his treehouse, one of the few sources of comfort available as
the boy battles leukemia.1 As reported in the St. Petersburg Times:
* B.A., Barnard College; J.D., Columbia University School of Law. The Author thanks
Professor William Garland for his valuable comments and Jeremy Adest, Elyssa Kates, Jenny
Kramer, Michael Rowan, Joseph Jay Majka, Lucia DeTrizio, and Grace Najarian for their fine
research assistance.
1. See Amy Herdy, Sick Boy’s Retreat Violates Rules, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 9,
2000, at 1B.
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Deed restrictions in Tampa Palms require removal of a
treehouse, the only place where a boy with leukemia finds
peace and solace . . . . To his parents . . . the treehouse is a
symbol of hope, a reminder of the brief time doctors thought
Brage had beaten cancer and he felt well enough to build it
with his father . . . . Yet, the homeowners association that
governs the Tampa Palms community has decided that the
treehouse must come down: it violates deed restrictions. In a
Nov. 9 letter to the Sassins, Tampa Palms community
association manager Maura Lear said, “this association
recognizes the extenuating circumstances in this case, and the
element of compassion has not been overlooked . . . . If we had
gone strictly by the book, a fine would have been imposed long
ago. All this being said, however, I must make this critical
point: Your treehouse structure is in direct violation of the
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for Tampa Palms.”2
The treehouse, at fourteen feet above the ground, violates
maximum height restrictions by six feet and thereby, according to the
Association, threatened to decrease surrounding property values.3
Widely derided in the popular press, one editorial described the
Association’s actions this way: “It’s not a story of deed restrictions
gone mad but of people gone mad with rules and power, lacking
compassion or discretion.”4 Ultimately, in the face of enormous
national pressure, the Association backed down.5
This article addresses the propriety of common interest
community (CIC) restrictions and governing board decisions
rendered with increased frequency in this golden age of
“privatization.”6 What are the standards to be applied by these private
2. Id.
3. See Group Wants to Demolish Treehouse of Sick Child, SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 10, 2000,
at 6B.
4. Targeting Treehouse is Heartless, Editorial, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at
10A.
5. See Happy Ending: Young Cancer Patient Can Keep Treehouse, ATLANTA J., Jan. 12,
2000, at 1A.
6. “Privatization” is the term used to describe the “shift from government provision of
functions and services to provision by the private sector.” George L. Priest, Introduction: The
Aims of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1988).
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governing bodies? What is the appropriate standard of judicial review
of their rules and determinations? The stakes are high, mindful that
the last half of the twentieth century saw the proliferation of common
interest communities in unprecedented numbers.7 Scores of people
have moved into suburban housing developments, urban as well as
suburban condominiums8 and cooperatives,9 and walled or gated
7. See, e.g., Patrick J. Rohan, Preparing Community Associations for the Twenty-First
Century: Anticipating the Legal Problems and Possible Solutions, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 3, 5-6
(1999) [hereinafter Rohan, Preparing Community Associations] (“Whether one focuses on the
housing pattern in large cities or upon suburbia, one is led inexorably to the conclusion that the
age of community association living, as opposed to renting or owning a one-family home, is
upon us. The rental market in every urban center is rapidly disappearing as high-rise buildings
are torn down, devoted to commercial uses, or converted into condominium or cooperative
housing.”). Professor Rohan sets forth several reasons for the shift to community association
living, including the continued growth of the retirement age population, commuters’
preferences for developments, with their amenities, rather than larger, more isolated tracts, and
the growing numbers of landlords who have felt compelled to abandon the rental market. See
id.; see also Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning
with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV.
827, 829 (1999) (“As of 1998, there were about 205,000 neighborhood associations in the
United States in which almost 42 million people lived, or about 15% of Americans. In the fifty
largest metropolitan areas, more than half of new housing is now built in neighborhood
associations.” Id. at 863. (citations omitted). The Author goes on to note that “[b]y some
estimates, neighborhood associations will house more than 50 million Americans, or about 20%
of the population by the year 2000.” Id. (citations omitted)); James L. Winokur, Critical
Assessment: The Financial Role of Community Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1135,
1137 (1998) (In past three decades, “common interest communities have evolved from an
innovation in suburban residential development to its main staple. In the largest United States
metropolitan areas, a majority of all new housing sold is now in common interest
communities.”).
8. See, e.g., Rohan, Preparing Community Associations, supra note 7, at 5-6. Professor
Rohan state’s,
Whether one focuses on the housing pattern in large cities or upon suburbia, one is led
inexorably to the conclusion that the age of community association living, as opposed
to renting or owning a one-family home, is upon us. The rental market in every urban
center is rapidly disappearing as high-rise buildings are torn down, devoted to
commercial uses, or converted into condominium or cooperative housing.
Id. Professor Rohan sets forth several reasons for the shift to community association living,
including the continued growth of the retirement age population, commuters’ preferences for
developments, with their amenities, rather than larger, more isolated tracts, and the growing
numbers of landlords who have felt compelled to abandon the rental market. See id.; see also
Nelson, supra note 7, at 829 (stating that “as of 1998, there were about 205,000 neighborhood
associations in the United States in which almost 42 million people lived, or about 15% of
Americans. In the fifty largest metropolitan areas, more than half of new housing is now built in
neighborhood associations.” Id. at 829. (citations omitted). The Author goes on to note that
“[b]y some estimates, neighborhood associations will house more than 50 million Americans,
or about 20% of the population by the year 2000.” Id. at 863 (citations omitted)); Winokur,
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communities.10 These forms of residential housing use elaborate
covenants and other forms of restrictive servitudes to privately
control and regulate land use and services.11 Community or
homeowners’ associations are formed and a governing board of
directors or trustees (board) elected to enforce these restrictions.
Courts are continuing to evolve guideposts for judicial review of
these restrictions. They are also endeavoring to establish guidelines
for when and under what circumstances board actions are a
reasonable, appropriate and good faith exercise of power as opposed
to an arbitrary and capricious abuse of vested authority. A growing
number of cases to assess the propriety of board duties apply “a body
of law looking superficially like that applied to officials of business
corporations.”12 For instance, analogies are made to the business
judgment rule of corporate law,13 which would impose upon
supra note 7, at 1138 (stating that in the past three decades, “common interest communities
have evolved from an innovation in suburban residential development to its main staple. In the
largest United States metropolitan areas, a majority of all new housing sold is now in common
interest communities.”).
9. The cooperative form of CIC, introduced in New York City in the nineteenth century,
creates a corporate structure to hold title to the land and building, with each resident owning
stock in the corporation and holding a renewable lease of a given unit. A board of directors,
elected by the resident shareholders, oversees operations. See 2A PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN
A. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 9.01-02 (1998) (setting forth the
governing structure of cooperative); Phillip N. Smith, Comment, A Survey of the Legal Aspects
of Cooperative Apartment Ownership, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305, 305-17 (1961) (outlining
various species of cooperative structure).
10. See David J. Kennedy, Note, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the
Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 778-93 (1995) (exploring
the phenomenon of gated communities and concluding that residential associations in such
communities be treated as “state actors,” thereby obligated to meet constitutional due process
and equal protection guarantees); see also Comment, Public Gated Residential Communities,
29 URB. LAW. 123, 124-25 (1997).
Long considered the domain of wealthy subdivisions on each coast, demand for gated
communities in medium-sized mid-American cities has increased dramatically since
the early 1980s . . . Typically, gated communities are private developments, planned as
such. Mandatory homeowners’ association dues provide not only for security
measures, but for the general upkeep of the streets and common areas themselves.
Id.
11. See Rohan, Preparing Community Associations, supra note 7, at 4 (stating that
“[c]ovenants now represent the backbone of community association arrangements of all types
and should be recognized to be as necessary and beneficial as zoning or other measures passed
by local governments”).
12. ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS § 10.1 (1989).
13. See, e.g., Lamden v. LaJolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Ass’n, 980 P.2d 950
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governing boards the duty to act in accord with the “good faith
exercise of business judgment.”14 By contrast, many, if not most,
courts have cast board obligations in terms of “reasonableness,”15
with an appropriate definition of that term still in progress. Still
others have tended to merge or blur the line between standards,
imposing fiduciary duties, again borrowing from the law of
corporations, in conjunction with some form of a rule of
reasonableness.16
(Cal. 1999) (applying the business judgment rule to uphold the condominium board’s decision
to treat termite infestation by “spot treatment” rather than fumigation); Levandusky v. One Fifth
Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 318 (N.Y. 1990) (applying business judgment rule to assess
propriety of cooperative board’s decision to deny permission to renovate); Dockside Ass’n v.
Detyens, 362 S.E.2d 874, 874 (S.C. 1987) (concluding that the business judgment rule applies
to a condominium association board decision to collect emergency assessments); Schoninger v.
Yardarm Beach Homeowners Ass’n, 134 A.D.2d 1, 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (stating that the
business judgment rule permits judicial interference only in face of fraud or other misconduct);
Schwarzmann v. Association of Apartment Owners of Bridgehaven, 655 P.2d 1177, 1180
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that when a board acts in accord with the business judgment
rule standard, it would not be liable in tort); Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 526 P.2d 316, 317 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1974) (determining that when board acts in honest exercise of its obligations the court
will not interfere); see generally Jeffrey A. Goldberg, Note, Community Association Use
Restrictions: Applying the Business Judgment Doctrine, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653 (1988).
14. Goldberg, supra note 13, at 664-64.
15. See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal.
1994) (holding that a restriction on pets is reasonable); River Terrace Condominium Ass’n v.
Lewis, 514 N.E.2d 732, 738 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the board’s decision to enter an
individual unit to exterminate for cockroaches was reasonable); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v.
Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the board’s decision to drill
a well was unreasonable); Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d 196 (198 Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that the board’s installation of locks on doors to common areas was a reasonable exercise of
authority); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (holding that the board’s restriction prohibiting alcoholic beverages in clubhouse was
reasonable); see generally Lewis A. Schiller, Limitations on the Enforceability of Condominium
Rules, 22 STETSON L. REV. 1133 (1983).
16. See, e.g., Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 401 A.2d 280, 285-87 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) (applying a reasonableness test with strands of the business judgment rule to
determine propriety of condominium association’s decision to impose penalties against unit
owners who defaulted on obligation to pay portion of special assessment). See also Dulaney
Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O’Brey, 418 A.2d 1233, 1238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980) (stating
that “a council of unit owners in a condominium may delegate its powers of administration or
management to a board of directors which may in turn make reasonable rules and regulations
concerning conduct, not inconsistent with the master deed and declaration and bylaws,
including the regulation or prohibition of pets”); Holleman v. Mission Trace Homeowner’s
Ass’n, 556 S.W.2d 632, 635-36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (providing examples of the melding of
strands of both the business judgment and reasonableness tests).
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Resorting exclusively to corporate law paradigms to pass on the
correctness of all manner of community association restrictions and
board actions is troublesome in several respects. First, it has been
noted that “[w]hile most community associations are incorporated,
the characteristics of the for-profit corporation and of a corporate
community association in a common interest community are
decidedly different.”17 Today, the majority of community
associations are incorporated as not-for-profit corporations.18 Yet, to
superimpose corporate or business models upon residential, family
settings seems inconsistent with, if not a dehumanization of, the
values, norms, and needs of home life.19 The determinations of
community association boards, unlike corporate board resolutions,
often have a very direct and sometimes profound impact on the lives
of residents, literally affecting people where they live. (The Sassin
family’s treehouse, noted at the beginning of this article, begs the
point.20) For that matter, courts borrowing from the corporate
jurisprudence sometimes confuse the standards applied, by, for
instance transmuting aspects of the business judgment rule into a rule
of reasonableness, using the two concepts interchangeably, or
seeming to articulate one standard when, in actuality, it appears as
though the other was intended.21
As one state’s highest court has observed, “For the guidance of
the courts and all other interested parties, obviously a single standard
for judicial review of the propriety of board action is desirable,
irrespective of the happenstance of the form of the lawsuit
challenging that action.”22 If a uniform rule is indeed desirable, is
17. WAYNE S. HYATT & SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 299 (1998) [hereinafter HYATT & FRENCH,
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW].
18. See Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 342 (1998) [hereinafter Hyatt, Common Interest Communities].
19. See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 143 (1994). Professor McKenzie finds the corporate
model inapposite to residential life, noting the possible “long term social and psychological
effect on the American family of having the corporate model imposed on the home and its
surroundings.” Id.
20. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
22. Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 533 N.E.2d 1317, 1323 (N.Y. 1990)
(imposing the business judgment rule to assess propriety of actions taken by cooperative
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there a standard sufficiently malleable and inclusive to appropriately
safeguard the interests at stake in each and every circumstance? As
Yogi Berra is said to have remarked, “It’s hard to predict. Especially
with respect to the future.” This notwithstanding, it would seem that
the appropriate standard is one rooted in reasonableness, which, at its
core, allows for an adjudicative posture that honors the fundamental
underpinnings of association functioning and structure, is responsive
to association aims, takes into account investment-backed owner
expectations, and appreciates the potential for abuse.
A multi-factored reasonableness test anchored in whether the
restriction or board decision at issue is rationally related to the
association’s purposes or imposes burdens that are disproportionate
to any benefits would best achieve that delicate balance between
board prerogative, the collective good, and individual welfare.
Further, it would encourage courts to be explicit about the relevant
considerations and values applied. The appropriate allocation of the
burden of proof (which, as to originating restrictions, as well as those
promulgated and made a matter of public record before the challenger
acquired the unit, should reside with the challenger) coupled with the
presumption of reasonableness for such restrictions, would allay
concerns of judicial over-reaching. In other words, when the
restriction is contained in the common interest community’s
declaration of covenants, conditions, and restriction (or by-laws,
where those are required to be recorded and therefore a matter of
public record), it should be presumed enforceable unless the unit
owner proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is
unreasonable. Thus, the restriction is presumed to be reasonable
unless proven otherwise. By contrast, when the rule, regulation, or
decision is subsequently adopted or rendered by the board, rather
than contained in the originating documents, the burden of proof
would reside with the board to demonstrate the reasonableness of its
actions.
A judicial posture grounded in considerations of reasonableness
preserves the opportunity to consider the equities and protects against
board abuse and unnecessary encroachments upon private behavior.
corporation’s governing board).
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The application of one standard to test both originating as well as
subsequently rendered rulings is efficient. At the same time, the
presumption of reasonableness afforded originating restrictions
promotes stability and deters judges from substituting their judgment
for that of the collective body. It recognizes that use restrictions are
an integral part of any common interest community and that the
success of any shared ownership arrangement depends in significant
measure on the “subordination of individual property rights to the
collective judgment of the owners’ association.”23 Further, it
acknowledges that originating restrictions, as “covenants running
with the land,”24 are a matter of public record and, as such, give at
least record notice to all prospective purchasers, who presumably
take “knowing of and accepting the restrictions to be imposed.”25
Judicial deference in this context protects members’ reliance interests
while honoring expectations and fostering stability.
On the other hand, subsequently-promulgated board rules,
regulations, and bylaws that, by definition, were not contained in the
originating scheme, are not entitled to the same degree of judicial
deference. Here there is less of a likelihood that members took with
record notice of the given rule. Additionally, subsequent adoptions
may not enjoy the sort of mandate that one would expect to find
associated with originating restrictions. Further, in those instances
where a board has the discretion to either permit or prohibit a given
use, enhanced judicial scrutiny is warranted to protect against “the
tyranny of the minority.”26 The presumption should favor the given
use, unless the board demonstrates that its denial is reasonable.
As to both originating restrictions and subsequently-rendered
board pronouncements, it is important that the construct of
reasonableness be meaningful as well as explicit. Something more
than judicial rubber-stamping is warranted when there is a risk that
the association will promulgate and impose restrictions in a way that
is inconsistent and incompatible with the collective aims and sense of
23. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Cal. 1994).
24. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
25. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637, 639 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
26. HYATT & FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW, supra note 17, at 321.
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the association members.27 Courts should be encouraged to carefully
and overtly balance the competing interests at stake, being sensitive
to the purposes and fabric of the given community when taken as a
whole.
To explore these premises, it is helpful first to review the structure
and internal workings of the modern community association.
Thereafter, it is instructive to assess courts’ application of the
business judgment rule and then the evolving rule of reasonableness,
to provide a comparative frame of reference and theoretical as well as
practical basis for review.
I. COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES: STRUCTURE, MECHANICS AND
GOVERNING LAWS
In an early description to withstand the test of time, common
interest communities are described as “residential private
governments,” possessing “much of the power and trappings of local
municipal government but [arising] out of private relationships.”28
Restrictions on use are an integral, essential aspect of any common
interest community, generally regarded as vital to preserving the
stable, planned environment that shared ownership aims to foster.29
27. See Clayton Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1375,
1411-12 (1994). Professor Gillette notes that “judicial intervention is not an unqualified
benefit,” and that judicial misconstruction of a given ambiguity would “impose on associations
the very activities that a majority of the association had agreed to avoid,” and thereby distort
“the signals sent by covenants about the nature of the association.” Id. at 1412. In addition, he
makes the point that judicial review of the reasonableness of restrictions is warranted when “the
risk of judicial error is outweighed by the possibility that the association will enforce covenants
in a manner inconsistent with the common vision of the association members.” Id.
28. Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 253, 253 (1976).
29. In the academy considerable debate surrounds the value and propriety of this inherent
restrictiveness. Some maintain that common interest communities are intrinsically coercive in
nature, with many residents deprived of a meaningful choice in the matter because of the dearth
of desirable housing alternatives in tight markets. See, e.g., Note, The Rule of Law in
Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472, 481-82 (1985); Gregory Alexander, Freedom,
Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 900-02 (1988); see also
MCKENZIE, supra note 19, at 21 (stating that community associations are “illiberal and
undemocratic”). Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1519, 1523 n.20 (1982) (stating that the “decision to join an association is as voluntary as
a human decision can be”). One’s position with respect to whether or not participation in a
community association is essentially voluntary rather than forced invariably influences one’s
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Typically, restrictions are imposed in the community’s declaration of
covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R) (alternatively called
the “Declaration of Condominium”) or by board-passed resolution or
decision, usually rendered on a case-by-case basis in response to a
given resident’s application to do something not specifically allowed
or proscribed by the CC&R. As to the former means of imposing
restrictions, the CC&R or “Declaration of Condominium” is the
community’s master document, “containing the plan of development
and ownership, the proposed method of operation, and the rights and
responsibilities of owners within the association.”30 This document
must be recorded prior to sales of the affected units. Thus, buyers are
on record or constructive notice of its contents. Restrictions contained
within this “master plan” of sorts are likened to “covenants running
with the land.”31
Typically, as an incident of ownership in the common interest
community, members are required to join the community or
homeowners association.32 A governing board, usually elected by and
from the community’s membership, enforces applicable restrictions
and regulations,33 sets policy and oversees the effectuation of that
policy.34 Further, “[t]he power to maintain property is very much part
view with respect to the appropriate standard of judicial review to be applied. See infra notes 50
146 and accompanying text.
30. WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE:
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW § 1.05 (b) (3) (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HYATT,
CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE].
31. See id.
32. See MCKENZIE, supra note 19, at 126-49; JONATHAN B. ALTER, THE LAW OF
CONDOMINIA AND PROPERTY OWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS 21-38 (1992).
33. See MCKENZIE, supra note 19, at 122 (stating that “[h]omeowner associations have
full legal rights, limited responsibility for the individuals who operate them, a potentially
infinite lifespan, and a dedication to . . . protection of property values. In carrying out this
purpose, homeowner associations function as private governments.”).
34. See HYATT & FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW supra note 17, at 277.
Governing documents and state law dictate the composition of the board, frequency of
meetings, notice requirements and other procedural matters relating to actual operation
of the board of directors. Differences in the community’s size and nature can result in
different approaches to the board’s structure and function. The larger the community,
the greater the likelihood of a large board. In a resort or second-home community,
boards meet less frequently, and it is common for them to meet by telephone
conference call in addition to meeting in person.
Id.
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of the basic function of a community association.”35
The latter part of the twentieth century saw the advent of two
significant bodies of law to address community association law. The
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA),36 which does
not yet enjoy widespread adoption,37 was promulgated in 1982 and
then amended in 1994 as a consolidation of the Uniform
Condominium Act, the Uniform Planned Community Act, and Model
Real Estate Cooperative Act.38 While the UCIOA does concern itself
with matters pertaining to the creation and termination of common
interest communities, as well as issues of finance, elections, and
meetings,39 it does not endeavor to set limits or standards with respect
to the sorts of restrictions that might be imposed upon residents. As
Professor French has noted, it “leaves to other areas of law, including
the general law of servitudes, the question whether there are
substantive limits on the degrees of freedom the developer can
require people to give up in order to become members of the common
interest community.”40 By contrast, the Restatement (Third) of
Property: Servitudes41 represents a comprehensive response to the
burst of common interest community development throughout the
35. Id. at 90.
36. UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1 (1982) [hereinafter UCIOA].
37. See generally Susan F. French, The Constitution of a Private Residential Government
Should Include a Bill of Rights, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 345-347 (1992) (describing
UCIOA and citing to state alternative versions of comprehensive uniform acts).
38. See generally Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act: Help or Hindrance?, 11
COM. LEASING L. & STRATEGY  (Sept. 1998):
The [UCIOA] automatically applies to all “common interest communities,” defined to
include “all real estate with respect to which a person, by virtue of his ownership of a
unit, is obligated to pay for real estate taxes, insurance premiums, maintenance or
improvement of other real estate described in a declaration.” The term “ownership”
includes any leasehold interest of 20 or more years (including renewals). However, the
act is generally not applicable to a “nonresidential common interest community,”
which is defined as a “common interest community in which all units are restricted
exclusively to nonresidential purposes.”
Id.
39. Article 1 of the UCIOA sets forth generally applicable principles, Article 2 pertains to
creation and termination of common interest communities, and Article 3 concerns management
matters, such as elections, meetings and financial management. See UCIOA §1 et seq. (1982).
40. French, supra note 37, at 347.
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES (Draft 1998); see infra notes 85-
87 and accompanying text.
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1970s, 1980s, and 1990s,42 and does set forth standards of care.43
The scope and detail of land use restrictions imposed upon
common interest community residents tends to be vast and often well
beyond the ken of even a very aggressive public zoning scheme.44
This, coupled with the broad rule-making and rule-enforcement
functions entrusted to association boards, renders conflict inevitable.
Indeed, empirical studies reveal dissension and strain when
characterizing relations between association boards and association
members.45 It has been noted that “[a]ssociation residents often view
the association board adversarially, seeing the board as an arms-
42. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 6.20-22 (Draft 1998). See
generally A. Dan Tarlock, Touch and Concern is Dead, Long Live the Doctrine, 77 Neb. L.
Rev. 804, 821-828 (1998) (providing insightful discussion of Restatement’s treatment of
servitudes as applied to common interest communities).
43. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
44. See Winokur, supra note 7, at 1174 & n.183.
Rather than broad dictates and classifications like those typical of many zoning
ordinances, which decree various densities of residential or other uses, community
association servitude regimes frequently regulate minute physical details of their unit
appearances, including such details as the color of the curtain liners or swing sets, the
location and content of planter boxes, and the sizes (to the 16th of an inch) of screws
used to install balcony enclosures.
Id. The case law reflects the breadth and scope of the restrictions. See, e.g. Stone Hill
Community Ass’n v. Norpel, 492 N.W.2d 409, 410 (Iowa 1992) (per curiam) (upholding
association’s ban of flags, notwithstanding challenger’s First Amendment claims); Murphy v.
Timber Trace Ass’n, 779 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. 1989) (upholding restriction on hours during
which “for sale” signs could appear); Korandovich v. Vista Plantation Condominium Ass’n, 19
Fla. L. Weekly 714 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (subjecting an association’s decision to ban
supplemental address numbers posted next to storm doors to the rule of reasonableness);
Killearn Acres Homeowners Ass’n v. Keever, 595 So. 2d 1019, 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(upholding restriction prohibiting satellite dishes); Amoco Realty Co. v. Montalbano, 478
N.E.2d 860 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (upholding restriction prohibiting use for business purposes);
Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O’Brey, 418 A.2d 1233 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980)
(upholding restriction prohibiting ownership of too many pets); Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (upholding age restriction). But see Chesapeake Estates Improvement
Ass’n v. Foster, 288 A.2d 329, 332-33 (Md. 1972) (concluding that a ban on factory-built
homes was unreasonable); Westfield Homes, Inc. v. Herrick, 593 N.E.2d 97, 102 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992) (deeming unreasonable an absolute ban on above-ground pools); Bear Creek Village
Condominium Ass’n v. Clark, No. 10401 (Mich. App. March 23, 1989) (finding unreasonable a
restriction outlawing dogs who exceed prescribed height and weight requirements); Kies v.
Hollub, 450 So. 2d 251, 255-56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (finding unreasonable an
association’s rejection of light poles on tennis court).
45. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. WILLIAMS & RONALD J. ADAMS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
CONDOMINIUMS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CONDOMINIUM OWNERS IN THE STATE OF
FLORIDA (1987).
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length provider of services for which residents pay dearly, and which
intrude upon residents activities in their own home.”46
Community association politics and board decision-making have
been described as complex and explosive:47
Factors contributing to the volatility of association political life
include (1) the diversity of backgrounds, interests, stages in the
life cycle, and expectations of community residents; (2) the
likelihood of conflicts over complaints about rule-violations by
residents’ own children; (3) the omnipresent conflict between
devotion of resources toward future property maintenance and
maintenance of lower present assessment levels; (4) possessive
feelings towards each resident’s home and freedoms to behave
within that home and its environs as the resident chooses,
which frequently confront detailed regulation of behavior
within and around the home; (5) widespread ignorance and
confusion among homeowners regarding the obligations to
which they are subject, often not freely chosen by these
residents when buying into the community; (6) the threat of
changing rules and assessment levels applicable to association
members; and (7) the juxtaposition of the friendship and
neighborliness expected among association members with the
conflicts, dissent, assessment and rule enforcement that are
traditionally viewed in our society as distinctly unfriendly and
non-neighborly.48
Against this backdrop, and with increased frequency, courts have
become the arbiters of disputes between governing boards and their
members.49 Judicial review provides an external check, a potential
46. Winokur, supra note 7, at 1175. Professor Winokur argues that additional empirical
data is needed to provide more meaningful insight into how common interest communities
function. He asks the important questions: “What types of communities are taking shape in our
community associations? . . . How are residents’ lives, and their perceptions of their
communities, enhanced, burdened or otherwise affected by present association practices?” Id. at
1175.
47. See id. at 1142, 1174-75.
48. Id. at 1143.
49. See Kennedy, supra note 10, at 761 (stating that “[a]s the number of residential
associations has increased, the consequent litigation has arisen largely in the context of disputes
between residential associations and their members over the content of frequently intrusive
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safeguard against abuse. In this complicated setting, various
standards (with varying levels of success) have been applied.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND REVIEW OF STANDARDS
A. The Business Judgment Rule: Sustaining Premises and Drawbacks
as Applied
The business judgment rule, a standard applicable to corporate
directors, is most often applied to review “management’s business
decisions and use of corporate assets.”50 It typically pertains “to
shareholder derivative actions brought to challenge the propriety of
management’s business decisions including such diverse matters as
investment choices, the making of contractual commitments, long-
range corporate planning and the decision as to whether it is in the
corporate interest to pursue an action against a director for waste.”51
Nonetheless, it has been applied by courts to evaluate the actions of
community association boards.52
Rather than assess the reasonableness of a given CC&R or
community association board decision, courts invoke the business
judgment rule, imposing the same yardstick used to assess the
integrity of corporate board actions.53 The rule presumes that the
governing board possesses the requisite authority to make the
determination or ruling in question.54 Neither the interests of the
rules and regulations.”); James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitude:
Toward Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L.
REV. 1, 63-64 (1989) (discussing the increase in litigation between association boards and
members).
50. Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1324 (N.Y. 1990)
(Titone, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 1325 (Titone, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
52. See, e.g., In re Croton River Club, Inc. v. Half Moon Bay Homeowners Ass’n, 52 F.3d
44-45 (2d Cir. 1995); Schoninger v. Yardarm Beach Homeowners’ Ass’n, 134 A.D.2d 1 (N.Y.
1987); Schwarzmann v. Association of Apartment Owners of Bridgehaven, 655 P.2d 1177,
1180-81 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominiums, 401 A.2d 280, 285-
86 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979); Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1318 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990);
see generally Goldberg, supra note 13.
53. See Schiller, supra note 15, at 1149-50.
54. See Papalexiou, 401 A.2d at 286.
If the corporate directors’ conduct is authorized, a showing must be made of fraud,
self-dealing or unconscionable conduct to justify judicial review. This presents an
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individual owner nor of the community as a whole become the
lynchpin for analysis. Rather, the standard asks whether the directors’
conduct is authorized. If so, the restriction is upheld unless it
represents the product of “dishonesty or incompetence.”55 To justify
judicial review, a challenger must show “fraud, self-dealing or
unconscionable conduct.”56 Thus:
[R]eview under the ‘business judgment’ rule is limited to
determining whether the challenged action is ‘taken in good
faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful and
legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes,’ because ‘courts
are ill-equipped . . . to evaluate what are and must be
essentially business judgments . . . [as to which] there can be
no available objective standard’ for measuring their
correctness.57
The New York Court of Appeals embraced the business judgment
standard in Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp.,58
establishing New York as the rule’s leading champion. In Levandusky
a co-op board denied an occupant permission to relocate certain
kitchen pipes as part of a proposed remodeling plan. The resident
went forward with the plans, and in response to the board’s issuance
of a “stop work” order brought suit to have the order lifted. The
state’s high court refused to second-guess the board: “[B]y definition
the responsibility for business judgments must rest with the corporate
directors; their individual capabilities and experience peculiarly
qualify them for the discharge of that responsibility.”59
issue of law rather than of fact. Although directors of a corporation have a fiduciary
relationship to the shareholders, they are not expected to be incapable of error. All that
is required is that persons in such positions act reasonably and in good faith in carrying
out their duties. Courts will not second-guess the actions of directors unless it appears
that they are the result of fraud, dishonesty or incompetence.
Id. (citations omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id.; see generally HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE,
supra note 30, § 6.02(a)(1), at 212-18, 213 (setting forth predicates of business judgment rule,
which include board members’ obligation to act with “good faith, diligence, care and skill”).
57. Levandusky, 553 N.E.2d at 132 (Titone, J., concurring).
58. 553 N.E.2d 1317 (N.Y. 1990).
59. Id. at 1322 (citation omitted).
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Levandusky is significant for its articulation of several factors
relevant to a determination of the propriety of board rulings. The
given board action or decision at issue must be undertaken in
furtherance of the purposes of the cooperative, within the scope of its
authority and in good faith.60 To set-aside a board ruling, the
challenger must show a “breach of fiduciary duty in the form of bad
faith, acts outside the board’s authority or discriminatory acts.”61 If
the occupant “demonstrates that the board’s action has no legitimate
relationship to the welfare of the cooperative, deliberately singles out
individuals for harmful treatment, is taken without notice or
consideration of the relevant facts, or is beyond the scope of the
board’s authority,”62 the board bears the burden of rebutting the
presumption that its actions were unlawful.
The business judgment rule seems best applied when owners in
common interest communities use the courts to challenge routine
maintenance, repair, rehabilitation, or other ministerial decisions
entrusted to their governing board’s discretion.63 In these sorts of
settings application of the rule is fitting because the board
determination or action at issue involves a kind of business judgment.
This is precisely the context in which the California Supreme Court
recently chose to adopt the business judgment rule. In Lamden v. La
Jolla Shores Clubdominium Homeowners Association,64 a
condominium unit owner sued the board for its decision to remedy
termite infestation by using “spot treatment” rather than fumigation.65
Alleging that the board’s determination to treat the problem locally
rather than centrally diminished her unit’s value, the owner sought
damages, an injunction and declaratory relief. The court issued the
following response to its own query “under what standard should a
court evaluate the board’s decision?”66
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Schoninger v. Yardarm Beach Homeowners’ Ass’n, 134 A.D.2d 1, 9 (N.Y.
1987).
64. 980 P.2d 940 (Cal. 1999).
65. See id. at 942.
66. Id.
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Where a duly constituted community association board, upon
reasonable investigation, in good faith and with regard for the
best interests of the community association and its members,
exercises discretion within the scope of its authority under
relevant statutes, covenants and restrictions to select among
means for discharging an obligation to maintain and repair a
development’s common areas, courts should defer to the
board’s authority and presumed expertise. Thus, we adopt
today for California courts a rule of judicial deference to
community association board decision-making that applies,
regardless of an association’s corporate status, when owners in
common interest developments seek to litigate ordinary
maintenance decisions entrusted to the discretion of their
associations’ board of directors.67
The court was quick to point out that in California, neither the
governing corporate statutes nor the common law business judgment
rule protect noncorporate entities. Since the defendant before it was
not incorporated, “the business judgment rule of deference to
corporate decision-making, at least as we previously have understood
it, has no direct application to the instant controversy.”68 Rather, the
court adopted a rule, “analogous perhaps to the business judgment
rule,”69 that would defer to the board’s competence and well-
positioned ability to make ordinary if not mundane maintenance or
repair decisions entrusted to its authority. The court noted that in this
arena “common sense” suggests that judicial deference is
appropriate,70 mindful of “the relative competence, over that of
courts, possessed by owners and directors of common interest
developments to make the detailed and peculiar economic decisions
necessary in the maintenance of those developments.”71 Significant
policy considerations favor such a posture:
67. See id. (citing Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 553 N.E.2d 1317, 537-
38 (N.Y. 1990)).
68. Lamden, 980 P.2d at 947.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 954.
71. Id.
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A deferential standard will, by minimizing the likelihood of
unproductive litigation over their governing associations’
discretionary economic decisions, foster stability, certainty and
predictability in the governance and management of common
interest developments. Beneficial corollaries include
enhancement of the incentives for essential voluntary owner
participation in common interest development governance and
conservation of scarce judicial resources.72
The court hastened to add, however, that its deference to the
governing board under the circumstances before it did not “foreclose
community association governance provisions that, within the bounds
of the law, might more narrowly circumscribe association or board
discretion.”73
Previously, in Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium
Association,74 the California Supreme Court had set forth a detailed
standard of reasonableness to provide the means for assessing the
enforceability of restrictions limiting the use of property within a
common interest community and contained in the originating
declaration.75 Lamden did not disturb that formulation but found it
inapplicable to the matter at bar, which involved the standard for
judicial review of discretionary economic decisions made by the
governing board.76
While the business judgment rule may be useful when courts are
asked to pass on the propriety of ordinary maintenance decisions, it
falls short when applied across the board to cases involving the
allegedly improper promulgation, implementation, and administration
of the bylaws, rules, and restrictions governing owners’ rights and
responsibilities.77 Certainly, the limited scope of judicial inquiry
72. See id.
73. Id. at 952.
74. 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994).
75. See infra notes 120-32 and accompanying text.
76. See Lamden v. LaJolla Shores Condominium Homeowners Assoc., 980 P.2d 940, 948
(Cal. 1999).
77. See generally Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and “Reasonableness” in
Private Law: The Special Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 41
(1990).
[T]he business judgment rule is a doctrine employed to insulate officials from liability
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permitted by the business judgment rule may well discourage
lawsuits and protect board authority. But these ends are not
necessarily always noble or desirable.78 The imposition, enforcement,
and administration of restrictions creates the significant potential for
infringement of rights. Moreover, the context for any abuse is
profoundly important. In the residential setting, persons affected
adversely feel those effects quite literally where they live.79 To apply
a standard intended to resolve shareholder grievances against
corporate boards to matters of home and lifestyle runs the risk of
compromising both the collective welfare as well as individual
liberties.80 What is appropriate for the boardroom may not suit the
living room.
A concurring member of the Levandusky court offered the astute
observation that “the classic formulation of the [business judgment]
rule is closely tailored to the open-ended decision making within a
virtually limitless universe of economic options that typify business
choices.”81 That universe, involving unmitigated business choices,
may well be outside the courts’ orbit of expertise. By contrast,
for their acts; it is not a standard of validity. Moreover, at least in its common law
form, the business judgment rule is founded upon principles of enterprise liability
totally inappropriate for review of the preservation and mediation functions of the
[property owners association.] It is hardly surprising, therefore, that despite their stated
reliance upon the rule, the courts that purport to apply it to [property owners
associations] actually impose reasonableness standards substantively indistinguishable
from those utilized in other [property owner association] review cases.
Id. at 51.
78. See generally Noble v. Murphy, 612 N.E.2d 266, 271 & n.7 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993)
(refusing to apply business judgment rule “as the measure of validity of the actions of a unit
owners’ organization”).
79. See generally Randolph C. Gwirtzman, Note, An Exception to the Levandusky
Business Judgment Rule: Owner and Shareholder Interests in Condominium and Cooperative
Board Decisions, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1021, 1024 (1993) (arguing that business judgment rule
is inapposite to residential setting); Todd Brower, Communities within the Community:
Consent, Constitutionalism, and Other Failures of Legal Theory in Residential Associations, 7
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 207 (1992) (arguing for “a legal theory for judicial review of
common interest developments which harmonizes the competing policies implicated in those
developments in light of the role which residential associations play in the lives of their
members and in larger society”).
80. See Stewart E. Sterk, Minority Protection in Residential Private Governments, 77
B.U. L. Rev. 273, 275-76 (1997).
81. Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 533 N.E.2d 1317, 1325 (N.Y. 1990)
(Titone, J., concurring).
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“courts’ extensive experience in reviewing licensing, zoning and
other discretionary administrative matters renders them well-suited,
rather than ‘ill-equipped,’ to deal with questions such as the
rationality or arbitrariness of a board decision to grant or deny a
shareholder’s application for permission to renovate.”82 It bears
mentioning that courts have had extensive experience in reviewing
and passing upon the reasonableness of servitudes.
For that matter, and typically without exception, the business
judgment rule imposes on the unit owner the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the board acted in violation of its
fiduciary obligation.83 While in most circumstances this allocation is
appropriate, in certain instances it should be up to the board to
demonstrate that its decision was reasonable.84
Significantly, the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes
tentative draft proposes that:
In addition to duties imposed by statute and the governing
documents, the association has the following duties to the
members of the common interest community: (a) to use
ordinary care and prudence in managing the property and
financial affairs of the community that are subject to its
control.85
The proposed section places the burden of proving a breach of
duty on the unit owner and challenger, and when the contested action
is one within the scope of association discretion, the owner bears “the
additional burden of proving that the breach has caused, or threatens
to cause, injury to the member individually or to the interests of the
common interest community.”86 The comments indicate that “[t]he
business judgment rule is not adopted, because the fit between
community associations and other types of corporations is not very
82. Id. at 1326 (Titone, J., concurring).
83. See, e.g., id. at 1322; see also DENIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 12 (4th ed. 1998).
84. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 6.13 (Tentative Draft No. 7,
1998).
86. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/25
p663+franzese.doc 01/04/01
2000] Common Interest Communities 683
close, and it provides too little protection against careless or risky
management of community property and financial affairs.”87
B. The Rule of Reasonableness as Applied
The past two decades have witnessed the development of a
significant body of cases to apply a standard of reasonableness to
community association actions.88 Moreover, several states have
imposed a reasonableness standard by statute, requiring that
restrictions contained in the given declaration be “reasonable”89 or
that courts enforce common interest community regulations only
when such enforcement would be “reasonable.”90
Judicial application of a reasonableness test reveals some
doctrinal confusion, particularly in the earlier jurisprudence. In some
decisions courts invoked the rhetoric of the business judgment rule
while actually applying a rule of reasonableness to the dispute at
hand.91 For example, in Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman,92
an action brought by a condominium owner to enjoin the enforcement
of a condominium association rule forbidding the use of alcoholic
beverages in the development’s clubhouse, the court couched the
relevant inquiry in terms of “whether the business judgment rule
should be applied to insulate the good faith action of the board of
managers of an unincorporated condominium from judicial review.
We [the court] conclude that the rule should be so applied.”93 In
87. Id. at cmt. b.
88. See infra notes 92-143 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-9-17 (1972 & Supp. 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36-
10 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-10(1) (1994).
90. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-9-9(3) (1991); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354 (1982); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:8B-13(d) (West 1989 & Supp. 1999).
91. See, e.g., Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 526 P.2d 316, 317 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974) (stating
that the business judgment rule should be the governing standard for assessing common interest
community association board’s actions. However, in that case the court also evaluated the
propriety of the actions in accordance with a sort of reasonableness lens.). Cf. Papalexiou v.
Tower W. Condo, 401 A.2d 280 (285 N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1979) (stating that a rule of
reasonableness must be applied to ascertain the integrity of a condominium association’s
decision to impose sanctions against those unit owners who failed to pay their fair share of a
special assessment. Notwithstanding this unequivocal assertion, the court proceeded to apply
the business judgment rule.).
92. 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
93. Id. at 182.
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actuality, the court imposed a rule of reasonableness, finding that the
association could adopt reasonable rules and that its rule prohibiting
the use of alcohol was indeed reasonable.
In passing favorably on the association’s action, the Norman court
set forth the following often-cited test:
[T]he association is not at liberty to adopt arbitrary or
capricious rules bearing no relationship to the health,
happiness and enjoyment of life of the various unit owners. On
the contrary, we believe the test is reasonableness. If a rule is
reasonable, the association can adopt it; if not, it cannot. It is
not necessary that conduct be so offensive as to constitute a
nuisance in order to justify regulation thereof. Of course, this
means that each case must be considered upon the peculiar
facts and circumstances thereto pertaining.94
The court did not outline the contours of its “fact-sensitive”
inquiry. (Later cases nicely advance a fact-specific approach rooted
not in the circumstances peculiar to the individual unit owner but
instead in consideration of the given community’s unique character
and purposes when viewed as a whole.95) Nor did it expressly
allocate the burden of proof. It did however, take notice
that inherent in the condominium concept is the principle that
to promote the health, happiness and peace of mind of the
majority of the unit owners since they are living in such close
proximity and using facilities in common, each unit owner
must give up a certain degree of freedom of choice which he
might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property.
Condominium unit owners comprise a little democratic sub-
society of necessity more restrictive as it pertains to use of
condominium property than may be existent outside the
condominium organization. The Declaration of Condominium
involved herein is replete with examples of the curtailment of
94. Id.
95. See infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
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individual rights usually associated with the private ownership
of property.96
As to such restrictive “curtailments,” the court did not distinguish
between those regulations contained in the CC&R and those later
promulgated by the community association’s board. This distinction
would come later, in Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso,97 when
the same court again invoked a standard of reasonableness, this time
to conclude that a mobile home condominium association had failed
to demonstrate that its denial of permission to drill a shallow well
was reasonably related to the association’s legitimate objectives.98
The court did not define reasonableness with any precision but did, to
its credit, make the important distinction between restrictions found
in the Declaration of Condominium itself and those put forth by the
association’s governing board. The former category enjoys “a very
strong presumption of validity,”99 insofar as those restrictions were
agreed to on purchase.100 The court observed that “[s]uch restrictions
are very much in the nature of covenants running with the land and
they will not be invalidated absent a showing that they are wholly
arbitrary in their application, in violation of public policy, or that they
abrogate some fundamental constitutional right.”101 In essence, the
court would afford virtually categorical enforcement to use
restrictions contained in the originating Declaration of Condominium,
to protect owners’ reliance interests as well as to avoid placing such
restrictions in a state of flux or uncertainty.102 Under this restriction-
protective posture, even restrictions that “may have a certain degree
of unreasonableness” would withstand challenge in the courts.103
96. Norman, 309 So. 2d at 181-82.
97. 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
98. See id. at 640.
99. Id. at 639.
100. Accord Ortega v. Kingfisher Homeowners Ass’n, 442 S.E.2d 202, 203-04 (S.C. Ct.
App. 1994) (binding a time-share condominium owners by originating restrictions); Chateaux
v. Daniels, 754 P.2d 425, 427 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding a condominium unit owner liable
for community assessments as set forth in originating declaration of covenants); Chateau
Village N. Condominium Ass’n v. Jordan, 643 P.2d 791, 792-93 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982)
(estopping unit owner from objecting to restrictive covenants contained in master declaration).
101. Basso, 393 So. 2d at 639-40.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 640.
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By contrast, the Basso court found that the second category of
restrictions (those later passed by the community association’s board)
must satisfy a requirement of reasonableness “to somewhat fetter the
discretion of the board of directors.”104 The court continued: “By
imposing such a standard, the board is required to enact rules and
make decisions that are reasonably related to the promotion of health,
happiness and peace of mind of the unit owners.”105 Here, the
presumption favors allowing the particular use in question, unless it
is “demonstrably antagonistic”106 to the community’s legitimate
objectives. Again, the court failed to explicitly allocate the burden of
proof, although implicitly it would seem that as to recorded
restrictions the burden of demonstrating a patent lack of
reasonableness would fall on the challenging unit owner, whereas the
board would have to demonstrate the reasonableness of subsequently
promulgated rules and decisions.
Basso has been applied judiciously in a number of controversies
arising throughout the nation,107 although decisions tend to blur the
distinction between those restrictions contained in the originating
documents and those subsequently imposed by the governing board.
For example, in Noble v. Murphy108 the appeals court of
Massachusetts found that a condominium use restriction prohibiting
pets and contained in the originating documents “‘was reasonably
related to the promotion of the health, happiness and peace of mind
of the unit owners.’”109 Thereafter, the court noted that “a somewhat
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See infra notes 108-12, 133 and accompanying text. In Florida, a more recent decision
applied the rule of reasonableness to all forms of subdivision plat amendments. (The
subdivision plat is essentially the equivalent of a condominium declaration.) The Holiday Pines
Property Owners Ass’n v. Wetherington, 596 So. 2d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) court stated
that
[i]n determining the enforceability of an amendment to restrictive covenants, the test is
one of reasonableness. While traditionally a reservation of the right to amend
restrictions would allow the grantor to change the entire character of a subdivision, the
modern view is that a reserved power to modify restrictions must be exercised in a
reasonable manner so as not to destroy the general plan of development.
Id. at 87.
108. 612 N.E.2d 266 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993).
109. Id. at 270 (quoting Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So.2d 637, 640 (Fla.
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different standard of review may be implicated where, in contrast to
this case, a restriction is promulgated after the owner who is in
violation of the rule acquires his unit.”110 In actuality, the court
interposed the two Basso standards, applying the reasonable relation
test to an originating restriction. Later, the court did articulate the
“very strong presumption of validity which arises from the fact that
each individual unit owner purchases his unit knowing of and
accepting the restrictions to be imposed.”111 It also observed that no
fundamental public policy or constitutional provision was at stake on
the facts at bar. It then set forth the policy imperatives at work:
By insulating properly-enacted and evenly-enforced use
restrictions contained in the master deed or original by-laws of
a condominium against attack except on constitutional or
public policy grounds, already crowded courts and the majority
of unit owners who may be presumed to have chosen not to
alter or rescind such restrictions will be spared the burden and
expense of highly particularized and lengthy litigation.112
Putting aside its ambivalent if not confused process of deduction,
Noble gets to the right result. Across the board, as to both originating
restrictions as well as subsequently promulgated rules and board
decisions, courts ought to apply a reasonableness standard rooted in
consideration of the association’s legitimate objectives and an
assessment of the rational relationship of the given action to those
objectives. This focus, coupled with examination of whether the
burdens imposed are disproportionate to the benefits, presents the
predicate for any meaningful application of a reasonableness test.
Much of the scholarship on the subject of reasonableness,
however, is sharply divided on issues pertaining to the appropriate
standard of review. Mindful of the potential for coercion, loss of
personal autonomy and overly excessive regimentation, some
theorists advocate a standard requiring even more than a rational
Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
110. Noble, 612 N.E.2d at 270.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 271.
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relationship.113 This view would oblige association boards to
demonstrate the validity of their regulations by a standard of
reasonableness that takes on procedural as well as substantive
dimensions.114 Hence, community associations would be subject to a
standard of review that is harsher than that applied to local
government.115 In the public domain, courts called upon to determine
the propriety of a given municipality’s actions typically apply the
rationality standard. To impose a harsher standard of review upon
community associations flies in the face of accepted approaches to
voluntary undertakings and privately bartered-for exchange.116 Those
who would make this point are divided as well, with some urging
judicial laissez-faire in most cases117 and others finding a more
113. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion and the Law of Servitudes, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 883, 900-02 (1988) (articulating a need for a higher standard of review);
Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1989) (stating that “communitarian theory justifies
substantive judicial review under the reasonableness standard”) [hereinafter Alexander,
Dilemmas of Group Autonomy]; Glen O. Robinson, Explaining Contingent Rights: The Puzzle
of “Obsolete Covenants,” 91 COLUM. L. REV. 546, 577-79 (1991) (replying to Alexander);
Sterk, supra note 80.
114. See, e.g., Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy, supra note 115, at 7.
With respect to the specific debate over residential associations, I argue that
communitarian theory justifies substantive judicial review under the reasonableness
standard as a dialogic form of legal intervention. The experience with residential
associations indicates why we should reject strong group autonomy for social groups
in general as a social condition that would pervert, rather than advance, the ideal of a
community.
Id.
115. See generally Steven Siegel, The Constitution and Private Government: Toward the
Recognition of Constitutional Rights in Private Residential Communities Fifty Years After
Marsh v. Alabama, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461 (1998) (advancing several theories of
state action with relevance to common interest communities); Harvey Rishikof & Alexander
Wohl, Private Communities or Public Governments: “The State Will Make the Call,” 30 VAL.
U. L. REV. 509 (1996) (exploring common interest communities and board actions as possible
“state action.”)
116. The so-called “contract argument” would have courts defer for the most part to
principles of freedom of contract and show respect for the structure and rules created by
unanimous private agreement. See Richard Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 906, 922-25 (1988). Still, freedom of contract is not an absolute, and is curtailed by
limiting doctrines such as unconscionability. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1999) (providing that if the
court, as a matter of law, finds a contract for the sale of the goods unconscionable in whole or in
part, it may refuse to enforce the contract, invalidate the objectionable clause(s) or so modify
the offensive part(s) as to avoid an unconscionable result).
117. See, e.g., Robert Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/25
p663+franzese.doc 01/04/01
2000] Common Interest Communities 689
moderate middle ground, advocating that courts avoid intrusions into
the internal workings of common interest communities, but finding
that judicial intervention is warranted when board actions are
unreasonable.118
Outside the academy, compelling court pronouncements endeavor
to give life to the meaning of reasonableness by making the point for
a rational basis approach that would neither presume to replace
association judgments with judicial second-guessing nor impose a set
of external values that are inconsistent with the association’s original
purposes.119 A sound approach presumes restrictions contained in the
common interest community’s declaration of covenants and
conditions enforceable unless the challenger sustains the burden of
proving that the restriction is unreasonable. The presumption
favoring reasonableness and the allocation of the burden of proof in
this way vindicates a vision of common interest communities as
essentially consensual, privately-ordered systems, which, absent a
showing to the contrary, provide the opportunity for meaningful
choice (members may enter or leave as they choose) without undue
heavy-handedness. Concurrently, the opportunity for judicial review
offers a safe harbor from disproportionately burdensome restrictions
and board oppressiveness. It acknowledges that while community
governance may be democratic in form, it may be coercive in
substance.
In Nahrstedt, a much-publicized case, the California Supreme
Court concluded that a restriction “will be enforced unless it violates
public policy; bears no rational relationship to the protection,
preservation, operation or purpose of the affected land; or otherwise
imposes burdens on the affected land that are so disproportionate to
1519 (1982) [hereinafter Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations]; Reichman, supra
note 28.
118. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA.
L. REV. 1589 (1982) (replying to Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, supra note
119); Robert Ellickson, A Reply to Michelman and Frug, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1602 (1982);
Richard Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906 (1988) (conceding
room for judicial gap-filling).
119. See, e.g., Valeti v. Hopkins, 926 P.2d 813 (Or. 1996); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village
Condominium Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994); Korandovich v. Vista Plantation Condo
Ass’n, 634 So.2d 273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Worthingten Condominium Unit Owners’
Ass’n v. Brown, 566 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
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the . . . beneficial effects that the restriction should not be
enforced.”120 In that case Ms. Nahrstedt, a condominium owner,
challenged the association’s enforcement against her of a pet
restriction contained in the recorded Declaration of Condominium.
When the association issued a twenty-five dollar fine because of the
three cats kept in her unit (a neighbor complained), Ms. Nahrstedt
sued.121
Interestingly, in California “reasonableness” as a standard is
imposed by statute: “The covenants and restrictions in the declaration
shall be enforceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable, and
shall inure to the benefit of and bind all owners of separate interests
in the development.”122 The state’s high court concluded, as a matter
of law, that the pet restriction was not arbitrary but rationally related
to legitimate association purposes, including the protection and
preservation of the health and quiet enjoyment of its residents.123 In
so ruling, the court was sensitive to the essential underpinnings of
association function: “Subordination of individual property rights to
the collective judgment of the owners association together with
restrictions on the use of real property comprise the chief attributes of
owning property in a common interest development.”124 Thus, an
originating restriction enjoys the presumption of enforceability unless
its opponent sustains the burden of proving that the restriction is
unreasonable.125 Such a posture appreciates the centrality and
importance of restrictions “as the primary means of achieving the
stability and predictability so essential to the success of a shared
ownership housing development.”126 It deters those who would
otherwise be inclined to seek judicially-created exemptions and
fosters certainty and predictability.
The Nahrstedt court rejected a fact-specific approach that would
look to those facts and circumstances peculiar to the objecting unit
120. 878 P.2d 1275, 1287 (Cal. 1994).
121. See Carl B. Kress, Beyond Nahrstedt: Reviewing Restrictions Governing Life in a
Property Owner Association, 42 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 837, 838 (1995).
122. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1354 (West Supp. 1998).
123. See Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1290.
124. Id. at 1282.
125. See id. at 1287.
126. Id.
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owner, but did endorse a fact-sensitive inquiry based upon
consideration of the particular common interest community’s
purposes as a whole.127 In this way, the court vindicates an important
mission articulated by Professor Ellickson:
[R]espect for private ordering requires a court applying the
reasonableness standard to comb the association’s original
documents to find the association’s collective purposes, and
then to determine whether the association’s actions have been
consonant with those purposes. To illustrate, the
reasonableness of a board rule banning alcoholic beverages
from the swimming pool area cannot be determined in the
abstract for all associations. So long as the rule at issue does
not violate fundamental external norms that constrain the
contracting process, the rule’s validity should not be tested
according to external values, for example, the precise package
of values that would constrain a comparable action by a public
organization. Rather, the validity of the rule should be judged
according to the enacting association’s own original
purposes.128
Judicial examination grounded in recognition of the association’s
own aims avoids the type of case-by-case review that, in the
Nahrstedt court’s words, “would impose great strain on the social
fabric” of the community and “put the owners and the homeowners
association in the difficult and divisive position of deciding whether
particular [restrictions] should be applied to a particular owner.”129 In
that case the pet restriction was not arbitrary, did not violate
127. See id. Here, the court’s standard could be at odds with the proposed Restatement’s
approach, which, as previously noted, would allow the unit owner the opportunity to prove
“that the breach has caused, or threatens to cause, injury to the member individually or to the
interests of the common interest community.” Restatement § 6.13; see supra note 85-87 and
accompanying text (emphasis added). Recently, the California Supreme Court recognized the
possibility that, “[d]epending upon how it is interpreted,” the Restatement’s standard might be
inconsistent with the standard set forth in Nahrstedt. Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium
Homeowners Ass’n, 980 P.2d 940, 952 & n.9 (Cal. 1999).
128. Professor Ellickson urges that courts refrain from entering the fray in most cases. See
Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, supra note 119.
129. Id. at 1530 (citations omitted); Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium
Association, 878 P.2d 1275, 1288 (Cal. 1994).
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applicable public policy, and was not disproportionately more
burdensome than beneficial to the community as a whole.130
At the same time, the Nahrstedt court’s move away from a
categorical, nearly wholesale endorsement of originating restrictions
in favor of a more equitable balancing test (whose presumptions
rightly favor the board) protects against unfair surprise and undue
hardship. Rather than serve a blind rubber-stamp function, it offers
the possibility of meaningful judicial redress in the face, for example,
of a restriction that is disproportionately burdensome or disparately
applied.131 Certainly, more exacting scrutiny of the individual unit
owner’s challenge is appropriate when the restriction at issue is
unequivocally recited in the community’s declaration of covenants,
conditions, and restrictions.132 In such instances, a strong
presumption of validity should attach, insofar as each unit owner
purchases with at least constructive knowledge of the restrictions to
attend ownership. Nonetheless, Nahrstedt appreciates that there could
be circumstances in which that presumption could, and should, be
overcome. In this way it improves upon the more unconditionally
approving posture advanced in decisions such as Basso.
By contrast, Basso sets forth a meaningful standard of review
when courts are faced with challenges to subsequently promulgated
rules or decisions.133 Review based on reasonableness should be
130. Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d, at 1290. The sole dissenting judge, the Honorable Armand
Arabian, took exception to this conclusion, finding the pet restriction arbitrary and
unreasonable. See id. at 1292. For a detailed exposition of the dissent’s position, see Armand
Arabian, Condos, Cats and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle Common, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 1
(1995).
131. See, e.g., Riss v. Angel, 934 P.2d 669 (Wash. 1997). In Riss the board had originating
power to “disapprove the design, finishing or painting of any construction that is not suitable or
desirable for any reason, aesthetic or otherwise.” Id. at 673. With that authority, the board
imposed upon the challenger unit owner restrictions that were “more burdensome” than those
specifically recited in the governing CC&R, such that the owner would be obliged to build on
his lot a home smaller than the one it replaced. See id. at 674. The Washington Supreme Court
departed from precedent to conclude that community association boards must act reasonably
and in good faith, and that while the general standard was enforceable, the board’s decision was
unreasonable. See id. at 679. Cf. Valenti v. Hopkins, 926 P.2d 813, 814 (Or. 1996) (holding that
a restrictive covenant deeming the architectural control committee “‘the sole judge of . . .
suitability’” rendered the committee’s decision non-reviewable absent showing of bad faith).
132. See Nahrstedt, 878 P.2d at 1284.
133. See generally Joseph E. Adams, Community Associations: 1998 Survey of Florida
Law, 23 NOVA L. REV. 65 (1998) (providing overview of caselaw development).
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applied with consistency to ensure that governing boards only “enact
rules and make decisions that are reasonably related to the promotion
of the health, happiness and peace of mind of the unit owners.”134 As
to regulations subsequently adopted, however, the board should have
the burden of proving the reasonableness of its actions. In Basso the
court ruled that in matters in which the governing board is vested
with discretion to permit or deny a given use, “the board must allow
the use unless the use is demonstrably antagonistic to the legitimate
objectives of the condominium association . . ..”135 There, the court
found that the board’s denial of permission to one of the
community’s residents who sought to drill a well was not reasonably
related to the board’s objectives. The board’s exercise of authority
was unreasonable in view of the fact that the drilling did not (contrary
to the board’s predictions) compromise the community’s common
wells or stain common areas.
Subsequently, in Worthinglen Condominium Association v.
Brown,136 an Ohio appellate court embraced the premise that
condominium owners enjoy some expectation of reasonableness as
concerns the discretionary judgments and amendments promulgated
by a board or association. In arriving at the appropriate standard, the
court established first that it would “‘examine condominium rules
and regulations in the context of the unique character of
condominium living,’”137 mindful that a unit buyer voluntarily
relinquishes some freedoms and willingly submits to the
condominium form of private ownership.138 However, the court
continued:
We do not, though, endorse the view that a person who
voluntarily enters the ranks of condominium ownership
surrenders all individual property rights. Individual property
receives some protection in the condominium arrangement,
although less than that accorded non-condominium property
134. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So.2d 637, 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
135. See generally Adams, supra note 135, at 90-103 (providing overview of caselaw
development).
136. 566 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
137. Id. at 1277.
138. See id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p663+franzese.doc 01/04/01
694 Festschrift [Vol. 3:663
. . .. Accordingly, we adopt the reasonableness test, pursuant to
which the validity of condominium rules is measured by
whether the rule is reasonable under the surrounding
circumstances. If the rule is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious in those circumstances, it is invalid.139
The Worthinglen court advanced several inquiries relevant to a
consideration of reasonableness: (1) whether the rule or board
determination is arbitrary or capricious, without a rational
relationship to legitimate community aims; (2) whether the rule or
determination is rendered even-handedly or instead in a
discriminatory manner; and (3) whether the rule or determination was
made in good faith for the common welfare of the owners and
occupants of the condominium.140 The first factor embraces the test
set forth in Norman.141 The second inquiry is intended to “protect
against the imposition by a majority of a rule or decision reasonable
on its face, in a way that is unreasonable and unfair to the minority
because its effect is to isolate and discriminate against the minority. It
provides a safeguard against the tyranny of the majority.”142 The last
prong finds the court melding elements of the business judgment rule
into its standard, citing precedent in which “the good faith required of
a corporate board of directors is analogized to that required of a
condominium board of managers. Both boards owe a duty of good
faith in managing property held in common by a group of owners.”143
III. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD: A MULTI-FACTORED
REASONABLENESS TEST
It is essential that any reasonableness test be sufficiently adaptable
and responsive to the aims, purposes, and fabric of the given
community at bar, taken as a whole. The aim should be a standard
“that balances multiple interests, preserves the community
139. Id. (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 1277-78.
141. Hidden Harbour Estate, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
142. Worthinglen, 566 N.E.2d at 1278.
143. Id. (citations omitted).
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association’s functions, protects flexibility, provides the powers
necessary to permit an association to remain dynamic during periods
of change, and yet reasonably protects the property owners’ reliance
interests and their expectations for an appropriate degree of
certainty.”144 Courts should be encouraged to be explicit in balancing
the values and interests at stake.
The appropriate lens, while honoring the essential predicates for
successful association functioning, must nonetheless appreciate the
potential for association overreaching and abuse. Courts are and
should be an appropriate external check against disproportionately
burdensome restraints. To this end, a multi-factored formulation
should be applied to determine reasonableness, rooted in
consideration of (1) the association’s original documents to discern
its collective aims and purposes; (2) whether the governing
documents clearly recited the restriction now at issue; (3) whether the
restriction bears a rational relationship to the association’s original
purposes and legitimate aims; (4) the restriction’s impact on the
consideration exchanged at the onset; (5) whether the restriction,
reasonable at the time it was executed, is now rendered unreasonable
as a consequence of changed circumstances; (6) whether the
restriction offends compelling public policy; (7) whether the
restriction is disproportionately more burdensome than beneficial to
the community as a whole; and (8) whether the restriction has been
applied consistently and evenhandedly, without disparate or
discriminatory effects.145
To protect buyers’ expectations, promote stability, and foster
certainty, significant deference should be given to restrictions
contained in the common interest community’s originating
declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions, with the
presumption favoring reasonableness. As to originating restrictions,
144. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities, supra note 18, at 323-24.
145. In Davidson Brothers v. Katz, 579 A.2d 288 (N.J. 1990), the New Jersey Supreme
Court set forth a multi-factored reasonableness test to determine whether an anti-competition
covenant would bind successors. In so doing, the court replaced the traditional “touch and
concern” requirement in the law of servitudes. For discussion of the propriety of resort to a
multi-factored test in that setting, see Paula A. Franzese, “Out of Touch:” The Diminished
Viability of the Touch and Concern Requirement in the Law of Servitudes, 21 SETON HALL L.
REV. 235 (1991).
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as well as those promulgated and made a matter of public record
before the challenger acquired the unit, unwarranted judicial intrusion
into privately-ordered affairs should be avoided. Absent just cause
one should not expect judicial displacement of privately allocated
rights, duties, and expectations that existed from the inception.146
Thus, in this setting the challenger should bear the burden of proving,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the restriction is
unreasonable. Conversely, those board decisions and rules that are
subsequently adopted for community governance should not enjoy
the same degree of judicial deference. Here, the board must
demonstrate the reasonableness of its actions.
Thus, restrictions contained in the common interest community’s
declaration of covenants and conditions should be enforceable unless
the challenger sustains the burden of proving otherwise. A strong
presumption of validity should attach to originating restrictions. By
contrast, the board should have the burden of demonstrating the
reasonableness of its subsequently-rendered decisions and rules for
community governance. Here, no presumption of validity would
attach as the court balances the collective benefits of the restriction
against its burden on private behavior.
IV. CONCLUSION
A reasonableness review that explicitly articulates the
considerations at work encourages judicial decision-making informed
by the values of the community association’s purposes as a whole.
The imposition of one standard to test both originating as well as
subsequently promulgated restrictions is efficient. An integrated,
comprehensive formulation aims to vindicate justifiable expectations
and reliance interests while rejecting rules and regulations that are
disproportionately burdensome or irrationally conceived. In this way,
courts provide meaningful protection from the potential tyranny of
the collective or of the minority. The appropriate allocation of the
146. The point has been made that the judicial process is thoroughly ill-equipped to resolve
conflicts between common interest community members, and that arbitration and mediation
techniques are far preferable to the delay, cost, memorialization and hostilities engendered by
resort to the courts. See Scott E. Mollen, Alternative Dispute Resolution of Condominium and
Cooperative Conflicts, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 75, 89-90 (1999).
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burden of proof, with the presumption favoring the reasonableness of
originating restrictions, guards against judicial over-reaching.
A multi-factored reasonableness test grounded in the association’s
own original aims affords the flexibility necessary to weigh the
competing interests at stake with the prevalent presumption being
that privately bargained-for expectancies should not be disturbed. A
contrary presumption as to originating restrictions would portend
unpredictability as well as the potential for compromise of principles
of freedom of contract. It has been observed that “individual
autonomy and community self-governance are two sides of the same
coin.”147 Too active a judicial role is not desirable in the context of
community association governance, insofar as the commonality of
interest and interdependence of association members should, at least
in theory, provide its own internal check against abuse and faulty
governance.148
Nonetheless, the opportunity for meaningful redress by the courts
must be preserved. Judicial review grounded in reasonableness
supplies the external check in those instances when the theory of
internal checks yields to harsh reality. Common interest community
governance “contains elements of both coercion and consent”149 and
inherent in board action is the potential for abuse.
147. Glen O. Robinson, Communities, 83 VA. L. REV. 269, 291 (1997).
148. Sterk, supra note 80, at 333.
149. Natelson, supra note 77, at 44.
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